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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a person who suffers what she believes is a violation of her 
constitutional rights due to the enforcement of a law that was enacted 
decades ago.  May she challenge the facial constitutionality of this law, 
or does the statute of limitations confine her to an as-applied challenge 
only?  There appears now to be considerable uncertainty among the bar 
and on the bench about this apparently simple question, and many 
practitioners and judges have come to the erroneous conclusion that 
facial challenges to the validity of laws must either be filed within a 
certain time frame after a challenged law is enacted or be barred by the 
 
* Senior Staff Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation.  J.D. 2002, Chapman University School of Law; 
B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College.  Special thanks to Christina M. Kohn and Pagona Stratoudakis for 
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statute of limitations.1  This error—which springs largely from an 
unfortunate overlap with regulatory takings law, itself the victim of 
much procedural confusion—has led courts into such mistakes as saying 
that statutes of limitations do not apply to First Amendment cases2 or 
recharacterizing cases in which laws were found facially invalid as as-
applied challenges.3  Worst of all, it has given many practitioners the 
misimpression that a facial challenge is time-barred one or two years 
after a challenged statute is enacted.  This is not correct. 
My purpose here is to separate out the different conceptual 
categories whose overlap has led to these mistakes.  In brief, the 
facial/as-applied distinction has nothing to do with the accrual or 
ripeness of a cause of action challenging the constitutionality of a law.  
The accrual date of facial and as-applied challenges is identical (with 
some exceptions, as we shall see), and mere enactment is rarely, if ever, 
the ripening event or the moment of accrual for a case in which a party 
mounts a facial challenge to a law.  The distinction between facial and 
as-applied challenges is, so to speak, substantive rather than formal; that 
distinction only characterizes the merits of a constitutional challenge.  
But that distinction has no relation to jurisdictional questions such as 
accrual, ripeness, or statutes of limitations.  A plaintiff may challenge a 
law’s validity at any time within the limitations period after that law has 
injured her, whether she chooses to argue that the law is facially 
unconstitutional or only unconstitutional as applied in her case.4 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Coral Constr. v. San Francisco, 116 Cal. App. 4th 6, 27 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 
2004), review granted, 167 P.3d 25 (Cal. 2007) (“[Party arguing that] facial challenge to an 
ordinance accrues when the ordinance is adopted.”); Chuck & Sons Towing, Inc., v. Town of 
Smithfield, No. PC-06-2530, at 6  (R.I. Sup. Ct.  Feb. 22, 2007) (“[W]hen making a constitutional 
challenge based on facial validity, the statute of limitations begins to run upon the enactment of the 
challenged provision.”); City of Dallas v. Lowenberg, 144 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. App. 2004), rev’d 
168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005) (“In a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, 
the statute of limitations begins to run upon the passage of the statute or the ordinance, with few 
exceptions not applicable here.”).  In SMDFund, Inc., v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Auth., 
(No. 02C01-0302-PL-12) (Allen County Cir. Ct. June 28, 2004), the trial court found a facial 
challenge time-barred because “A facial challenge is a claim that the ‘mere enactment’ of a statute 
is unconstitutional,” id. at 3, but the appellate court affirmed on laches grounds, not statute of 
limitations grounds.  SMDFund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Auth., 831 N.E.2d 725 
(Ind. 2005). 
 2.  See, e.g., Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing cases); Frye v. 
City of Kannapolis, 109 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Lamar Whiteco Outdoor Corp. v. 
City of W. Chicago, 823 N.E.2d 610, 621 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2005). 
 3.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 1997 WL 
312604, at * 2 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 4.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2000) (“[T]here is no single distinctive category of facial, as 
2
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II. THE FACIAL/AS-APPLIED DISTINCTION DOES NOT RELATE TO 
JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES 
The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is the 
focus of considerable scholarly controversy.5  Conceptualizing how 
these two categories differ, and what courts are actually doing when 
using these terms, is not easy.  Nor is the history of the distinction clear.6  
But whatever the outcome of these debates might eventually be, the 
facial/as-applied distinction is a way of categorizing the type of alleged 
constitutional violation.  A plaintiff who argues that a law is facially 
invalid is claiming that the law is not, and never can be, applied in a way 
that satisfies constitutional restrictions.  This is a claim that some 
fundamental flaw renders the challenged law inherently unconstitutional, 
regardless of factual circumstances of a particular case.7  An as-applied 
challenge, by contrast, holds that while some circumstances may exist in 
which the challenged law is within constitutional boundaries, something 
special about this case has caused it to exceed those bounds.8  As 
 
opposed to as-applied, litigation.  Rather, all challenges to statutes arise when a particular litigant 
claims that a statute cannot be enforced against her.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce 
Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 54 (2006) (citing examples of scholarly debate surrounding facial/as-
applied distinction); Fallon, supra note 4; Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal 
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994). 
 6.  The facial/as-applied distinction appears to have evolved as a part of the “overbreadth” 
challenge in First Amendment cases, see Anthony M. Barlow, Note: First Amendment Protection of 
Free Press and Expression: State Licensing Laws for Newspaper Vending Machines, 58 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 285, 286-289 (1990), which allows a litigant to argue that a law violates the free speech rights 
of others, even if the law is valid in her own case—something which she would lack standing to do 
outside of the context of the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 
452-53 (1938).  The overbreadth doctrine reflects the “preferred position” of “the freedoms of the 
First Amendment,” Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948), which position was an outgrowth 
of the New Deal jurisprudential revolution.  See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
NEW DEAL CH. 5 (2000).  Since that period, the distinction has grown beyond the First Amendment 
context.  See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743-46 (1987). 
 7.  See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.  Facial invalidity means “that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid.”  Id. 
 8.  See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 9 Cal. 4th 1069, 1084 (Cal. 1995) (explaining 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges).  There is an intriguing parallel here with the 
distinction between necessary and synthetic truths in Humean or Kantian epistemology.  Cf. 
WALLACE I. MATSON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 341-42 (1968); 2 WILHELM WINDELBAND, A 
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 532-67 (New York: Harper & Brothers 1958) (1901).  A facial challenge 
might be characterized as an argument that a law is a necessary constitutional violation, while an as-
applied challenge contends that the unconstitutionality is synthetic.  This parallel is further 
suggested by the Salerno Court’s reference to “categorical imperative[s]” in analyzing a facial 
challenge.  481 U.S. at 748.  The shortcomings of this conception of philosophical truth—see, e.g., 
Leonard Peikoff, The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy (1967) reprinted in AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION 
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Richard Fallon has noted, facial challenges “are not sharply categorically 
distinct from as-applied challenges.”9  Rather, the terms “facial” and “as 
applied” simply describe different kinds of arguments on the merits.  
With the possibly confusing exception of a relationship between 
third party standing and facial unconstitutionality,10 it is at least clear 
 
TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY 88-121 (2d ed. 1990)—might be responsible for the puzzles and 
paradoxes that appear when one investigates the facial/as-applied distinction in greater depth. 
 9.  Fallon, supra note 4, at 1336. 
 10.  Third-party standing cases are a possible source of confusion regarding the timing of a 
facial challenge, and, given the complexity of third-party standing, we may be excused for putting it 
to one side and addressing here only the typical facial challenge brought by a plaintiff on her own 
behalf.  But some brief comments on third party facial cases are in order.   
This kind of case originates in an overlap between the facial/as-applied distinction and 
its parent concept of overbreadth.  Overbreadth allows a plaintiff to allege that a law, though 
constitutional in her own case, should nevertheless be found invalid because it would infringe on the 
constitutional rights someone else.  See, e.g., Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 
U.S. 947, 957 (1984).  This is one kind of prudential third-party standing, which allows one person 
to assert the rights of another, most commonly allowed in the First Amendment context.  See 
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-30 (2004).  Although the Supreme Court has usually found 
third-party standing improper due to the jurisdictional requirements imposed by Article III of the 
Constitution, there are cases outside the First Amendment in which such standing is allowed.  Id. at 
129-30.  See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (“The standing 
requirement is born partly of ‘“an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and 
explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, 
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”’”).  A plaintiff who is granted third-party 
standing will typically argue a law is unconstitutional regardless of the fact that her particular rights 
are not violated.  But she might argue either that the law is facially unconstitutional or 
unconstitutional as-applied.  Family members, for example, often have third party standing to assert 
the rights of other family members, and a parent might argue either that a law is unconstitutional as 
applied to her child, or that the law is unconstitutional in every circumstance.  See, e.g., Hodel v. 
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987) (children had third party standing to assert rights of deceased 
parents); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parent arguing on behalf of child, and in 
vain, that law was facially unconstitutional).  Likewise, a doctor who challenges the 
constitutionality of an abortion restriction may assert the rights of her patients, and argue that the 
law is facially unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-18 (1976). 
The frequency of this kind of case has sown confusion between the concepts of standing 
and facial unconstitutionality.  See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 80 n.3 (1999) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]acial challenge is a species of third-party standing.”).  But these two 
have little to do with each other outside the context of third-party constitutional claims, and even in 
that context they are not identical.  See Fallon, supra note 4, at 1359 (“There is indeed an underlying 
affinity between doctrines that invite facial challenges (such as the First Amendment ‘overbreadth’ 
test) and third-party standing doctrines, but only one that is exceedingly abstract: Both are governed 
by rules reflecting judicial judgments about the doctrinal structure that is appropriate to achieve 
effective implementation of constitutional norms and not about the moral deserts of particular 
litigants.”).  In third-party cases, the litigant may assert the facial unconstitutionality of a law which 
is not unconstitutional in her own case, but she must still have standing to do so.  That standing is 
not conferred by her mere allegation of facial unconstitutionality, since Article III forbids that, but is 
conferred by her close relationship to the party who has been affected by the alleged 
unconstitutionality.  See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991).  Instead, it is conferred by the 
government taking some act which affects her rights and by which her cause of action accrues.  A 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/2
FINAL SANDEFUR EIC READY.DOC 1/25/2010  2:33 PM 
2010] THE TIMING OF FACIAL CHALLENGES 55 
that the facial/as-applied distinction categorizes only the nature of the 
alleged constitutional violation and has nothing to do with jurisdictional 
limits such as ripeness, accrual, statutes of limitations, or, in the case in 
which a plaintiff asserts her own rights, with standing.  These threshold 
jurisdictional concepts are tools for determining whether the court has 
authority to hear a case, not whether the law is or is not inherently 
constitutional, or constitutional in some cases and unconstitutional in 
others.  “Under Article III, a federal court must always begin a case, 
framed by the concrete facts including an allegation of harm to a specific 
plaintiff caused by an identified defendant.”11  A plaintiff who brings a 
constitutional challenge must first demonstrate standing (third party or 
otherwise), and then argue on the merits that the law is unconstitutional.  
Whether she chooses to argue that it is unconstitutional facially (i.e., in 
all cases) or only as-applied (i.e., in some cases and not others) has no 
bearing on the standing requirements of Article III. 
Both facial and as-applied lawsuits are also subject to other 
traditional jurisdictional limits.  For example, the statute of limitations 
requires a plaintiff to bring her case within a certain period after her 
cause of action accrues, and a cause of action accrues when the party 
knows or should know of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.12  
Thus when a defendant argues that a lawsuit is barred by the statute of 
limitations, the question will turn on when the plaintiff’s cause of action 
accrued—that is, when the injury was final or “ripe.”  The terms 
“ripeness” and “accrual of a cause of action” are synonymous in most 
(but not all13) cases.  A case is ripe when all factors necessary to state a 
claim are present—that is, when no further action is necessary to make 
the plaintiff’s injury certain.  In most cases, the moment of accrual and 
ripeness is obvious and simultaneous: it is when the plaintiff’s car 
accident happens, or when the plaintiff slips on the banana peel.  But in 
cases involving administrative decisions, such as a case involving a 
government denial of a building permit application, accrual and ripeness 
can be complicated.  There, a cause of action will accrue when the 
 
facial challenge may then be brought within the limitations period after that act.  Thus, third-party 
standing cases are consistent with my thesis that facial challenges to a statute do not need to be 
brought within a certain time limit after mere enactment. 
 11.  Fallon, supra note 4, at 1336-37. 
 12.  See, e.g., Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 13.  See Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (“[O]nce a claim has 
accrued it is necessarily ripe; but the converse, that once a claim is ripe it has necessarily accrued 
for statute-of-limitations purposes, need not follow.  Where, as here, the plaintiff challenges the 
constitutionality of an event that has not yet occurred, the claim may be ripe for adjudication 
without having accrued for statute-of-limitations purposes.”) 
5
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plaintiff knows for certain that the objectionable permit requirement will 
be applied to her,14 and her case will be ripe when the government 
makes its final decision on the permit application and the applicable 
administrative appeals have been exhausted.15   
Once a plaintiff’s cause of action has accrued, she may file a 
lawsuit at any time until the statute of limitations period runs out.  And 
once a plaintiff is in court, she may then argue whatever theory is 
appropriate to her circumstances.  In the usual case, whether the plaintiff 
chooses to argue that the law which she claims injured her is always 
unconstitutional (facial) or that it is unconstitutional only in her 
particular case (as-applied) bears no relationship to the question of 
accrual, and therefore no relationship to the statute of limitations.  As a 
jurisdictional matter, she must prove that her case is ripe—that she has 
really been injured by that law16—and that she filed suit within the 
applicable statute of limitations period after the injury.  But the nature of 
that injuring incident—or the timing of the ripening event—is not 
affected by, and does not affect, her argument as to the law’s validity or 
invalidity.  That is an entirely separate inquiry.  Therefore, to paraphrase 
Professor Fallon, all federal litigation is, in a sense, “as-applied” since a 
court lacking power to issue advisory opinions can only hear cases in 
which a law has been (or will soon be) applied.  Once that litigation has 
begun, a plaintiff may demonstrate that the law by which she was 
 
 14. See, e.g., Norco Const., Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 15.  Except in cases seeking just compensation for a taking property, a plaintiff bringing suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not required to exhaust her administrative remedies.  Compare Patsy v. 
Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (“[E]xhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under § 
1983”), with Williamson County Reg’l. Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193-94 
(1985) (exhaustion is required for cases seeking just compensation for regulatory takings). 
 16.  In a case involving third-party standing, of course, the plaintiff must show that the person 
on whose behalf the lawsuit is brought has a ripe case and has been injured in some way by the law.  
In some cases, third-party plaintiffs argue that the mere fact that an allegedly unconstitutional law 
has been enacted is the injury and thus the moment at which the cause of action accrues.  Such 
plaintiffs also typically argue that the law is facially unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood 
Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  Because such cases are generally 
brought immediately upon the enactment of a law, by a party who is not herself injured, see id. at 
967, and who argues that the law is unconstitutional in every conceivable circumstance, it can 
sometimes look as though the ripeness and standing involved are flimsy.  But while precipitate 
third-party facial challenges can therefore resemble advisory opinions, they are not.  The standing 
requirements of Article III forbid federal courts from ever hearing constitutional arguments brought 
by individuals who merely think a law is unconstitutional but have no real interest at stake.  See 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986).  Therefore, although prudential standing rules may 
be lenient in cases brought immediately upon the passage of a law by plaintiffs alleging the rights of 
others, and the factual record sparse, such cases must still satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites, 
including standing and ripeness. 
6
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injured is necessarily and in all cases unconstitutional, in which case 
“facial invalidation occurs as an outgrowth of as-applied adjudication.”17 
Some examples help illustrate these principles.  In Lawrence v. 
Texas,18 a defendant was prosecuted in 1998 under a law that prohibited 
certain types of “deviate” sexual conduct.19  The law was enacted in the 
1970s, and most recently amended in 1993, yet the plaintiffs argued that 
the law was facially unconstitutional,20 and this argument was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court.  The defendant was therefore able to advance a 
facial challenge on the merits because his injury occurred when he was 
arrested under a law he alleged to be unconstitutional.  Likewise, in 
Brown v. Barry,21 the plaintiff wanted to operate a business shining 
shoes and discovered that a law on the books for nearly a century 
required him to obtain a special permit to do so.  His injury accrued 
when he learned of the licensing requirement and the fact that it applied 
to him.  In his suit for injunctive relief, he was free to argue either that 
the law was unconstitutional in all circumstances or that it was 
constitutional sometimes but not in his case.  Either way, his lawsuit was 
timely because it was filed within the limitations period after the cause 
of action accrued—that is, after he learned that he would be required to 
get the license.  And in 3570 East Foothill Blvd., Inc. v. City of 
Pasadena,22 a business which was subject to an unconstitutional 
ordinance could challenge the ordinance’s facial validity, regardless of 
its age, because the case was brought within the statutory period after the 
ordinance was applied. 
In Travis v. County of Santa Cruz,23 the California Supreme Court 
explained the rule precisely.  There, the plaintiff attacked a county 
zoning ordinance on various grounds.  The county argued that the case 
was time-barred, but the Court rejected this argument, noting that it was:  
not a case in which the plaintiff complains of injury solely from a law’s 
enactment. . . .  Travis complains of injury arising from, and seeks 
relief from . . . the County’s imposition on his second unit permit of 
conditions required by the Ordinance.  Having brought his action in a 
 
 17.  Fallon, supra note 4, at 1337. 
 18.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 19.  See generally Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 
1235-38 (2004). 
 20.  See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2001) (noting 
that Lawrence was arguing that the law was facially unconstitutional). 
 21.  710 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 22.  912 F. Supp. 1268 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
      23.    33 Cal. 4th 757 (2004). 
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timely way after application of the Ordinance to him, Travis may raise 
in that action a facial attack on the Ordinance’s validity.24 
The facial/as-applied distinction is simply not related to accrual 
and, thus, has nothing to do with the statute of limitations.  So long as a 
party satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites of Article III, or whatever 
other formal requirements apply, she may then proceed to argue that the 
law being applied to her is either facially invalid or is invalid only in her 
particular case.  In no circumstance is a facially unconstitutional law 
rendered immune from facial challenges merely by the passage of time 
after enactment.25 
III. CONFUSIONS BETWEEN FACIAL CHALLENGES AND FACIAL TAKINGS 
A. Examples of Confusion 
We have seen that a facial challenge is just one type of argument on 
the merits that, like an as-applied challenge, can be raised whenever 
jurisdictional standards such as standing and ripeness are met; facial 
challenges are not subject to different timing or accrual analysis than as-
applied challenges.  Although this argument seems basic, courts have 
occasionally erred by holding that a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a law is time-barred because the case was filed too 
long after the enactment of a law—in other words, that the cause of 
action in a facial challenge accrues when the challenged law is adopted.  
This is incorrect. 
In Lowenberg v. City of Dallas,26 the Texas Supreme Court 
recognized that the appellate court erred in this way.  The case involved 
a Dallas ordinance requiring owners of commercial buildings to pay a 
fee and obtain a registration certificate.  The city repealed the ordinance 
almost exactly a year after enacting it, but the city did not make the 
repeal retroactive, and therefore did not refund the fees that had been 
paid; moreover, it continued to collect money from owners who had not 
paid during the ordinance’s short life.27  Then, three years after the 
 
 24. Id. at 768-69 (emphasis added). 
 25. As Justice Souter observed in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 746 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting), there are many cases where suing “puts nothing in a plaintiff’s pocket and can take a 
great deal out,” and where other influences, such as social ostracism can deter the bringing of a 
lawsuit.  This is one good reason why lawsuits over constitutional issues, including facial 
challenges, should not be barred merely by the passage of time after the enactment of the challenged 
law. 
 26.  168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005). 
 27.  Lowenberg, 144 S.W.3d. at 48. 
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repeal, property owners filed a lawsuit contending that the fees were 
unconstitutional and demanding a refund.28  The court of appeals found 
that this facial challenge was untimely because “[i]n a facial challenge to 
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, the statute of limitations 
begins to run upon the passage of the statute.”29    
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed.30  The Justices noted 
that the court of appeals had relied on cases concerning regulatory 
takings, which differed from the challenge at hand.31  The property 
owners were not arguing that the fee requirement imposed a regulatory 
taking; they were arguing that the fee was unauthorized under other 
constitutional provisions.  Their injury accrued not when the law was 
enacted, but when they were required to pay the fee.32  The trial court 
had erred by confusing a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a law 
with a takings claim.  Outside of the domain of regulatory takings cases, 
“a cause of action accrues when a wrong produces an injury.”33  Because 
the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit within the statutory period after their 
injury, the case was timely.34 
Barancik v. County of Marin is an even more prominent example of 
an appellate court erroneously concluded that a facial challenge to a law 
must be brought within a specific period after the law’s enactment.35  
There, the plaintiff brought suit in 1985 against a land-use decision, not 
on the grounds that it constituted a regulatory taking, but as a violation 
of due process.36  The Ninth Circuit abruptly declared that “Barancik’s 
facial challenge is barred by the statute of limitations.  The cause of 
action accrued either in 1972 or 1975 or, at the latest, 1979”37—years in 
which the challenged zoning plans were adopted or amended.  But 
Barancik was not denied a permit to construct until 1984, meaning his 
complaint was filed well within the statutory period after his injury.  At 
that point, he should have been allowed to challenge the facial validity 
of the land-use regulation on due process grounds.   
 
 28.  Id.  In fact, they first filed a lawsuit in federal court, then voluntarily dismissed the case 
and filed a case in state court. 
 29.  Id. at 49. 
 30.  Lowenberg, 168 S.W.3d at 802. 
 31.  Id. at 801.  Facial takings, as opposed to facial challenges, are discussed infra, section 
II.B. 
 32.  Id. (citing Lubbock Co. v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2002)). 
 33.  Id. at 802. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989). 
 36.  Barancik, 872 F.2d at 836. 
 37.  Id. 
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Given that the case involved a land-use decision, it might have been 
that the Ninth Circuit was simply construing Barancik’s due process 
challenge as a regulatory takings claim; after all, the Ninth Circuit later 
declared that a property owner with both due process and takings claims 
is generally required to bring only her takings claim, because it is more 
specific.38  This rule—which was probably abrogated in the recent case 
of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.39—might have led the court to believe 
that Barancik was seeking just compensation for diminution in property 
value.40  As explained below, it is common for courts to hold that such 
compensation claims do accrue at the time that a challenged law is 
enacted.  But Barancik was not bringing a takings argument: his claim 
was that the zoning law had no rational connection to public health and 
safety—i.e., that the law was invalid—not that it worked a 
constitutionally valid taking of property for which he deserved 
compensation.  Thus if the court did construe his case as a takings claim, 
it erred by confusing two separate categories of constitutional 
arguments; but if it did not, it erred by concluding that Barancik’s facial 
due process challenge accrued upon the enactment of the law. 
In RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,41 by contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit correctly found that a facial challenge was not barred by the mere 
passage of time.  There, nightclub owners alleged that the city engaged 
in an unfair, racially biased campaign to shut down clubs playing rap 
music.  Along with their allegations of official harassment, they also 
contended that the city’s nightclub ordinance was vague and 
overbroad.42  The lawsuit was filed five years after the city enacted an 
ordinance cracking down on rap clubs, and seven years after the 
plaintiffs claimed the harassment began.43  The case was plagued by 
significant statutes of limitations problems, but the court of appeals 
concluded that the owners’ injury accrued when the city “initiated the 
abatement action,”44 which came when the city “informed them of its 
 
 38.  Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1996); Macri v. King County, 
126 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 1997).  
 39.  544 U.S. 528 (2005).  See Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control 
Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Armendariz was abrogated by Lingle). 
 40.  This is unclear, given the brevity of the Barancik decision and its failure to cite 
applicable authority.  Moreover, now that the Supreme Court has made the distinction between due 
process and takings claims clearer, the usefulness of the Barancik decision is questionable.   
 41.  307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 42.  Id. at 1050. 
 43.  Id. at 1054. 
 44.  Id. at 1061. 
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decision to prosecute.”45  While some of the city’s actions were therefore 
outside the limitations period (thus eliminating some of the as-applied 
causes of action) the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal 
of one of their claims and also reversed its dismissal of the owners’ 
facial challenges to the ordinance: “Because the Ordinance was enforced 
against appellants within the limitations period, this was error.”46   
The brevity of the court’s treatment of this point might obscure the 
importance of this conclusion: There is simply no categorical rule that a 
law becomes insulated from facial challenge by the mere passage of 
time.  Accrual is a preliminary jurisdictional question necessary for 
getting the plaintiff through the courthouse door.  The time at which a 
cause of action accrues will differ depending on the facts of the case, but 
it will come whenever the plaintiff’s rights are finally and clearly 
affected pursuant to the law that she believes is unconstitutional.  At that 
point, the plaintiff can allege that the challenged law is facially invalid 
and/or that it is invalid as applied to her.   
B. The Source of Confusion: Takings Versus Challenges 
The origin of the misapprehension that a facial challenge cannot be 
brought beyond the statutory period after enactment lies in confusion 
between two different types of constitutional claims: 1) cases involving 
facial challenges to the validity of a law and 2) cases involving facial 
regulatory takings claims.  The two are quite distinct.47 
A facial challenge is the argument that a law is void on its face; that 
it is necessarily a violation of the Constitution in any and all 
applications.48  The proper remedy in such a case is typically not 
compensation but an injunction against enforcement and a declaration 
that the law is invalid.  Such a challenge does not necessarily allege that 
the plaintiff was injured when the law was enacted.  Thus, a case 
alleging facial unconstitutionality is ripe not simply when the law is 
passed but, just like an as-applied challenge, when the government acts 
pursuant to that law and adversely affects the plaintiff’s rights.  A facial 
challenge is just one argument a plaintiff might make after she has been 
 
 45.  Id. at 1059. 
 46.  Id. at 1063. 
 47.  One example of a case that appears to confuse the language of the two categories is Santa 
Monica Beach Ltd. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 952, 961 (Cal. 1999), where the California 
Supreme Court characterized the plaintiff’s “inverse condemnation action”—i.e., regulatory takings 
claim—as a “facial challenge.” 
 48.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. 
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injured by the application of that law; facial challenges are “‘incidents’ 
of as-applied adjudication.”49 
A facially unconstitutional law could conceivably linger on the 
books for many years before finally affecting a plaintiff.  Imagine, for 
instance, a community in which all the citizens are white and in which 
an ordinance forbids black persons from voting.  That ordinance would 
be facially unconstitutional, even though it would not affect any of the 
residents.  But years later, when a black person moves into that 
community and discovers that the law forbids him from voting, he has 
suffered an injury, his cause of action accrues, and he may seek redress 
by challenging the facial constitutionality of the law.  This sort of 
situation happens frequently.  Recent cases striking down laws against 
same-sex marriage found that plaintiffs could challenge the facial 
validity of such laws even though they were enacted before many of the 
plaintiffs were even born.50  In Sei Fujii v. State, the California Supreme 
Court found the Alien Land Law—which barred Asian immigrants from 
owning real property in the state—facially invalid, despite the fact that it 
was decades old.51  In State v. Palendrano,52 the New Jersey Superior 
Court found it facially unconstitutional (indeed, “obnoxious” and 
“senseless”53) to prosecute a woman for being a “common scold,” even 
though this had been a common law crime since the days of William 
Blackstone. 
A facial taking, on the other hand, occurs when the enactment of a 
challenged law inherently constitutes a taking of property under the Fifth 
Amendment, for which the owner is due just compensation.  The 
Supreme Court has concluded that such an injury generally accrues upon 
the passage of the law, and, therefore, the statute of limitations clock 
begins to run at the moment of enactment.54  There is good reason to 
doubt the propriety of this rule, as Michael Berger has noted: “Why 
should one facial invalidity under the Bill of Rights be shielded by 
limitations, but not the other?  The only explanation is the poor relation 
 
 49.  Fallon, supra note 4, at 1336. 
 50.  See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v. Department of Pub. 
Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003). 
 51.  38 Cal. 2d 718, 737-38 (Cal. 1952). 
 52.  293 A.2d 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972). 
 53.  Id. at 752. 
 54.  Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997).  See also 
Brubaker Amusement Co., Inc. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied 
sub nom. Penn Triple S v. United States, 538 U.S. 921 (2003). 
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status of property-rights protection.”55  Be that as it may, the theory 
adopted by many courts is that a facial takings claim is not an argument 
for invalidity per se, but rather an argument that the enactment of a law 
has diminished the plaintiff’s property value and that the plaintiff is 
entitled to compensation at that moment.  Thus, in Levald v. City of 
Palm Desert,56 the Ninth Circuit described “the differences between a 
statute that effects a taking and a statute that inflicts some other kind of 
harm” by observing that in facial takings cases, “the basis of a facial 
challenge is that the very enactment of the statute has reduced the value 
of the property or has affected a transfer of a property interest.  This is a 
single harm, measurable and compensable when the statute is passed.  
Thus, it is not inconsistent to say that different rules adhere in the facial 
takings context and other contexts.”57   
One objection to this theory of facial takings is that it has the 
potential of depriving subsequent purchasers of the right to challenge 
restrictions of property rights that took effect prior to purchase, even 
though that right has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court.58  
This confusion indicates the need for further clarification by the 
Supreme Court, but it need not detain us here.  For our purposes it 
suffices that a facial takings claim is not a facial constitutional challenge.  
Indeed, a claim for just compensation actually presupposes the 
constitutional validity of the law in question, as the Supreme Court made 
clear in Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc.59  The normative question of 
whether a law is constitutionally legitimate is answered by reference to 
the Due Process and Public Use Clauses (among others), not by the Just 
Compensation Clause.60  The latter simply says that the government 
 
 55.  Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 124 n.104 (2000). 
 56.  998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 57.  Id. at 688.  Accord, Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
 58.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“Were we to accept the State’s 
rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action 
restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.  A State would be allowed, in effect, to 
put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.  This ought not to be the rule.  Future generations, too, 
have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.”) 
 59.  544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 60.  See id. at 543: “[Questions about a] regulation’s underlying validity…[are] logically prior 
to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings Clause 
presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.  The Clause 
expressly requires compensation where government takes private property ‘for public use.’  It does 
not bar government from interfering with property rights, but rather requires compensation ‘in the 
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.’  Conversely, if a government action 
is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is 
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must pay for an otherwise legitimate taking of property.  The Just 
Compensation Clause is not a kind of penalty for unconstitutional acts; 
rather, it is the second step in a two-part analysis.  First, is the restriction 
on property rights a legitimate exercise of government authority?  If not, 
the law is unconstitutional.  If so, the government may proceed, so long 
as it compensates.61   
Two regulatory takings cases from the Ninth Circuit, National 
Ass’n of Home Builders of U.S. v. City of Los Angeles62 and Carson 
Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson,63 explicitly observe the 
distinction between facial challenges and facial takings, but these cases 
employ somewhat confusing language.  In National Ass’n of Home 
Builders, an unpublished case, the plaintiffs challenged a Los Angeles 
ordinance imposing certain confiscatory conditions on building permits.  
They argued that the conditions did not meet the standards required by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard,64 and therefore 
that the ordinances incorporating those conditions imposed a regulatory 
taking for which they were entitled to just compensation.65  The court 
noted that this facial takings claim accrued upon the enactment of the 
ordinance, and it distinguished facial takings claims from facial 
challenges to the constitutionality of a law.66  But the court’s brief 
discussion of the differences between facial takings and facial challenges 
included a misleading comment.  The plaintiffs had urged the court to 
allow their facial challenge to proceed because “the Supreme Court has 
considered the constitutionality of statutes scores of years after 
enactment, citing Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia . . . and Brown v. 
Board of Educ.”67  But “Loving and Brown,” wrote the court, “involved 
 
so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry.  No amount of compensation 
can authorize such action.” (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles 
County, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis added)).  See also Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 
U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Takings Clause . . . has not been understood 
to be a substantive or absolute limit on the government’s power to act.  The Clause operates as a 
conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.  
The Clause presupposes what the government intends to do is otherwise constitutional”). 
 61.   This is not to suggest that invalidation is never a proper remedy for a regulatory taking; 
in fact, there are probably cases where it is proper.  This, too, is a matter of controversy that is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  See generally Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on 
The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to The “Gang of Five’s” Views on Just Compensation 
for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 685, 703-04 (1986).  
 62.  1997 WL 312604 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 63.  37 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 64.  512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 65.  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 1997 WL 312604, at * 2. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at *3. 
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as-applied, not facial constitutional challenges.”68  This is not correct.  In 
both Loving and Brown, the Supreme Court found the challenged laws to 
be facially unconstitutional; that is, the racially discriminatory laws 
could in no circumstance be applied in a constitutional manner.69   
In fact, the facial/as-applied distinction appears to make little sense 
in cases alleging that a statute violates equal protection, since the 
argument in such cases is that the statute in question is predicated upon 
an unfairly biased legal background.70  In his dissent in the 1985 
Cleburne decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out that “[t]o my 
knowledge, the Court has never before treated an equal protection 
challenge to a statute on an as-applied basis.  When statutes rest on 
impermissibly overbroad generalizations, our cases have invalidated the 
presumption on its face.”71  Loving and Brown were not as-applied cases, 
but facial challenges mounted by plaintiffs who appropriately brought 
suit within the limitations period after they themselves were injured. 
The Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders decision rightly observed that 
neither Loving nor Brown were facial takings claims,72 but by 
mischaracterizing those cases as as-applied constitutional challenges, the 
court overlooked their real significance: Neither Loving nor Brown were 
subject to the special accrual standard that applies to facial takings 
claims because they were not takings cases.  They were facial 
challenges, which are not barred by the mere age of the challenged 
statute. 
The Carson Harbor court did not make this error.  There, the 
plaintiffs argued that a land-use regulation effected a taking of their 
property without compensation.  They brought two different kinds of 
takings arguments: first, that the law transferred some of the value of 
their property to others, and second, that the law failed to substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest as required under Agins v. Tiburon.73  
The court concluded that their injury occurred upon the enactment of the 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“There can be no doubt that restricting the 
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated 
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived 
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 70.  Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 431 n.319 (1998). 
 71.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 476 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 72.  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 1997 WL 312604, at *3. 
 73.  37 F.3d at 473 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
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law, because “[b]oth facial claims necessarily rest on the premise that an 
interest in property was taken from all mobile home property owners 
upon the statute’s enactment.”74  This conclusion is consistent with the 
facial takings rule.  
Nevertheless, Carson Harbor included two important 
misconceptions.  First, the plaintiffs there brought both a facial takings 
claim and a facial challenge.  They argued not only that the law took 
their property for public use, but also that the law was constitutionally 
invalid because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest.  At the time Carson Harbor was decided, the “substantial 
advancement” theory was seen as a takings claim, which may explain 
the court’s decision, but the Supreme Court has since declared that this 
is a due process, and not a takings theory,75 and the Carson Harbor court 
itself seemed to anticipate this, commenting in a footnote that “[w]hen 
the effects of a regulation do not ‘substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest,’ compensation is not automatically due.  Rather, the proper 
remedy for an invalid exercise of the police power is amendment or 
withdrawal of the regulation and, if authorized and appropriate, 
damages.”76  If the plaintiffs were bringing a due process claim, their 
injury did not accrue at the time the statute was enacted, but instead at 
the time when their rights were affected by the statute.   
Secondly, and relatedly, the Carson Harbor court concluded that, 
under the rule requiring facial takings claims to be brought within a 
certain period of the enactment of the challenged law, “[a] landowner 
who purchase[s] land after an alleged taking cannot avail himself of the 
Just Compensation Clause because he has suffered no injury.”77  This 
conclusion is consistent with the decisions of many courts, but 
significant doubt was cast on it by the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
conclusion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,78 stating that “[f]uture 
generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on 
the use and value of land.”79  In Palazzolo, the Court held that the mere 
passage of time cannot insulate a land-use regulation from the Fifth 
Amendment’s compensation requirement.80  But whatever the proper 
 
 74.  Id. at 476. 
 75.  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. 
 76.  Carson Harbor, 37 F.3d at 473 n.4. 
 77.  Id. at 476. 
 78.  533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 79.  Id. at 627.  See also Travis, 33 Cal.4th at 770-71. 
 80.  533 U.S. at 630. 
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time limits for facial takings claims might be after Palazzolo81 is 
irrelevant to the question of when facial challenges accrue.  If anything, 
Palazzolo moves the facial takings rule in the direction of the facial 
challenges rule, not the other way around. 
To see how the confusion between the timing of facial takings and 
facial challenges operates in practice, consider Coral Construction v. 
San Francisco,82 in which a plaintiff argued that a San Francisco 
ordinance violated the California Constitution by granting certain 
preferences to public contractors based on the contractor’s race.  The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the city on the grounds that the 
plaintiff, Coral, lacked standing.83  On appeal, the city argued that the 
court should affirm this dismissal on other grounds as well: namely, the 
complaint ought to have been construed as a facial challenge to the city’s 
contracting policies, and any facial challenge was barred by the statute 
of limitations.84  “The statute of limitations for asserting an infringement 
of constitutional rights is one year,” the city argued.  “And because 
Coral’s challenge was a facial one, Coral’s cause of action accrued on 
the date that the ordinance became effective.”85  The court of appeals 
found that the case was actually an as-applied rather than a facial 
challenge, and therefore it did not address this argument,86 but it is worth 
considering as an example of the deleterious effects of confusing facial 
challenges with facial takings for statute of limitations purposes.87   
 
 81.  Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion suggested that the timing of a land-use regulation 
will continue to affect a court’s consideration of a taking.  See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-33 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), the Court strongly suggested that her less precise formulation would 
govern in future cases.  See id. at 335-37.  See further J. David Breemer & R.S. Radford, The 
(Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts’ 
Disturbing Insistence on Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 351 (2005). 
 82.  116 Cal. App. 4th 6 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2004), review granted, 167 P.3d 25 (Cal. 2007). 
 83.  Id. at 14. 
 84.  Brief of Respondent, Coral Constr. v. City of San Francisco, No. A101842 (Cal Ct. App. 
1st Dist. Div. 4) at 32. 
 85.  Id. at 33. 
 86.  116 Cal. App. 4th at 27. 
 87.  Other examples include Chuck & Sons Towing, Inc., supra note 1, in which the court 
declared that, “when making a constitutional challenge based on facial validity, the statute of 
limitations begins to run upon the enactment of the challenged provision.”  Id. at 6.  To support this 
conclusion it cited three federal cases: Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2004); Dunn-
McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283 (5th Cir. 1997); and Levald, 
Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993); as well as a dissenting opinion in a state 
case, L.A. Realty  v. Town Council, 698 A.2d 202, 220 (R.I. 1997) (Flanders, J., dissenting).  But 
Maldonado and Levald were regulatory takings cases and therefore inapplicable, and Dunn-
McCampbell involved the six-year statutory limitations period on all claims against the United 
States, not any jurisdictional rule facial challenge accrue upon the enactment of the challenged law.  
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The city cited five cases in support of its claim that facial 
challenges to statutes are barred if brought too late after the enactment of 
the statute: Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt,88 Utility Cost 
Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water District,89 Acuna v. Regents 
of University of California,90 Hensler v. City of Glendale,91 and Barancik 
v. County of Marin.92  Yet none of these cases even remotely stands for 
this proposition.93   
Babbitt and Utility Cost Management both involved specific 
statutes limiting particular kinds of actions.  Babbitt involved the 
statutory six-year jurisdictional time limit imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 
2401(a) on all damages claims against the United States94; Utility Cost 
Management found a case was filed too late under the California 
Mitigation Fee Act—specifically, because section 66022 of the 
California Government Code requires any challenge to the imposition of 
a “fee or service charge” to be brought within 120 days of its imposition.  
These cases neither dealt with common law statutes of limitations, nor 
declared that a plaintiff must bring a facial challenge to a law within a 
certain period after its enactment.  Neither do Acuna, Hensler, or 
Barancik.  Acuna was not a facial challenge in the first place, but a suit 
by a college professor who alleged that he was denied tenure because of 
his political views.95  The court found that his cause of action accrued 
when his tenure application was rejected—a routine ripeness analysis.96  
 
The dissent in L.A. Realty, which was also a regulatory takings case, simply never addresses the 
statute of limitations at all.  Nevertheless, the Chuck & Sons court went on to find that the case was 
time-barred for other reasons as well, therefore making its conclusion on this point technically 
dictum. 
 88.  15 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 89.  26 Cal. 4th 1185 (2001) 
 90.  56 Cal. App. 4th 639 (1997) 
 91.  8 Cal. 4th 1 (1994) 
 92.  872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989). 
 93.  The city also cited Cal. Civ. Pro. § 340(3), which applies to damages actions.  Since 
Coral was in part a damages action, this provision was arguably applicable, but it has nothing to do 
with facial constitutionality arguments.  That statute merely applies to cases against the government 
seeking damages. 
 94.  15 F. Supp. 2d at 24. Statutes of limitations are divided into two categories: jurisdictional 
time limits by which courts are divested of jurisdiction after a certain time period and the traditional 
common law statute of limitations, which is a matter of repose for stale claims.  See Wood-Ivey Sys. 
Corp. v. United States, 4 F.3d 961, 965 (4th Cir. 1993).  It is exceedingly confusing that the term 
“statute of limitations” implies that the limit is statutory, when in fact it is not; a statute of 
limitations is a common law principle subject to such prudential constructions as equitable tolling.  
Id. at 966.  But an actual statute, like 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), is not a “statute of limitations”; it is a 
statutory jurisdictional time limit which a court lacks power to alter.  See Wood-Ivey, 4 F.3d at 965. 
 95.  56 Cal. App. 4th at 644. 
 96.  Id. at 647. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/2
FINAL SANDEFUR EIC READY.DOC 1/25/2010  2:33 PM 
2010] THE TIMING OF FACIAL CHALLENGES 69 
Hensler was a regulatory takings case, and therefore subject to the 
special rule discussed above for facial takings claims.97  And, as we have 
seen, Barancik was either a regulatory takings case, or a wrongly 
decided substantive due process case. 
Thus, although Coral was not bringing a facial challenge, it could 
have, contrary to the city’s argument.  The argument that a law is 
facially invalid simply does not expire due to the passage of time after 
enactment of that law.  Instead, once a plaintiff is injured by the 
application of a law,98 she may challenge it at any time within the 
limitations period.  She is not limited to arguing that the law is invalid as 
applied to her.  Until the statute of limitations expires, she may challenge 
the statute either on the grounds that it is not and can never be 
constitutional (facially invalid) or on the grounds that it is constitutional 
sometimes but not in her particular case (invalid as-applied). 
C. Other Potentially Confusing Cases 
There are some unusual cases in which a cause of action other than 
a takings claim will accrue upon the mere enactment of a law.  This 
occurs in the rare circumstance in which a person is injured by the legal 
change itself, as when a law repeals a benefit to which a person is 
entitled.  For example, in Waltower v. Kaiser,99 a convict challenged the 
constitutionality of a state law that eliminated a program under which he 
would have been eligible for early parole.  The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the case was filed too late because the statute of 
limitations began to run on the adoption of the repeal.100  “As a general 
rule,” the court noted, “‘a cause of action accrues when all events 
necessary to state a claim have occurred.’  With regard to Mr. 
Waltower’s facial challenge, all events necessary to state a claim 
occurred when the Act became effective.”101  The court did not find that 
facial challenges are inherently due within a certain period after the 
enactment of a challenged law; on the contrary, Waltower’s right to 
 
 97.  8 Cal. 4th at 22 (“If the challenge is to the facial validity of a land-use regulation, the 
statute of limitations runs from the date the statute becomes effective.”).  Hensler also involved a 
statute, Cal. Gov. Code § 65009, which expressly declares that challenges to amendments to zoning 
ordinances must be brought within 120 days of the enactment of the amendment.  8 Cal. 4th at 22 
n.10. 
       98.  There are some rare cases in which a plaintiff is injured due to mere enactment.  See infra, 
Section II.C. 
 99.  17 F. App’x. 738 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 100.  Id. at 740. 
 101.  Id. (quoting United States v. Hess, 194 F.3d 1164, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
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participate in the parole program was wholly eliminated when the law 
became effective.  Thus, no further facts or incidents were necessary to 
develop his injury; that injury was complete upon enactment.   
Likewise, in Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina v. United 
States,102 an Indian tribe brought suit for compensation after a federal 
law subjected the tribe to state adverse possession laws, allowing 
individuals to take title to some of the tribe’s land.  The court found that 
the case was brought too late because the tribe’s injury occurred at one 
of two moments: either when the statute had been enacted (and not, as 
the tribe argued, when a court interpreted the law as applying to the 
tribe103), or at “the end rather than the beginning of the ten-year adverse 
possession period.”104  In either case, the challenge was brought too late.   
Although the court did not decide which was the proper accrual 
date, the first option is consistent with the Waltower court’s holding that, 
when a plaintiff is directly injured by a change in the legal background 
itself, that injury is the moment a cause of action accrues.105  Neither 
case stands for the proposition that the injury in a facial challenge 
necessarily accrues when the challenged law is enacted.  Instead, under 
the circumstances of those cases—in which legislation fundamentally 
altered the legal background in which a party claimed a vested right—
the injury happened to occur upon enactment. 
Finally, challenges to the validity of federal regulations also make 
up an area of potential confusion.  Congress has by statute established a 
six-year limitations period on all actions against the United States,106 and 
courts have repeatedly declared that facial challenges to the validity of 
federal regulations must consequently be brought within six years of the 
moment when these regulations are first published in the Federal 
Register.107  This might mislead a person into concluding that, six years 
 
 102.  982 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).   
 103.  Id. at 1570 (“While the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in 1986 might be relevant to 
fixing the time when the Tribe subjectively first knew what the Act meant, it is fundamental 
jurisprudence that the Act’s objective meaning and effect were fixed when the Act was adopted.  
Any later judicial pronouncements simply explain, but do not create, the operative effect.”) 
 104.  Id. at 1571. 
 105.  Id. (“At that time, possessors of the tribal lands holding under deeds from the State of 
South Carolina could begin to acquire adverse possession rights against the Tribe . . . .  Any suit 
based on the theories presented necessarily would have to have been filed [within the limitations 
period of this incident].”) 
 106.  28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2000). 
 107.  See, e.g., Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 713-16 (9th Cir. 
1991) (explaining six-year limitations rule for federal regulations); Dunn-McCampbell Royalty 
Interest, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1997) (“On a facial challenge to 
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after publication, regulations are immune from facial challenge.  But that 
is incorrect, as a closer examination of the cases reveals.  Publication of 
a regulation is deemed the moment of accrual only to those parties who 
are subject to the rule at that time.108  It is not and cannot be an injury to 
a party who is not at that time subject to the rule—for example, a 
business founded more than a half-dozen years after the initial 
publication of the challenged regulation.  For such a plaintiff, the injury, 
as is true of any other case, accrues when the plaintiff is made aware (or 
should know) that the rule will apply.  At that point, the plaintiff is free 
to challenge the validity of the regulation either as applied or facially—
that is, the plaintiff can argue that the regulation can in no sense be valid, 
or that it might be valid in other cases, but not in the case at bar.  The 
rule governing facial challenges to federal regulation is therefore entirely 
consistent with the position defended here: that accrual is unaffected by 
the plaintiff’s choice between a facial or an as-applied theory.  
IV. REPOSE, PREFERRED RIGHTS, AND OTHER CONFUSIONS 
A. Is The Statute of Limitations Applicable to First Amendment Cases? 
It is unfortunately common for the law to remedy an old error by 
adopting new ones.  That appears to be happening as a result of 
confusions arising from the timing of facial and as-applied challenges in 
the context of the First Amendment.  The confusion has led some courts 
into the misimpression that the statute of limitations simply does not 
apply to First Amendment cases.109  This is incorrect.  But because many 
First Amendment lawsuits involving statute of limitations arguments 
have been brought as challenges to land-use regulations that affect 
expressive rights, the rule applied in regulatory takings cases has 
sometimes been conflated with the rules applicable to other kinds of 
 
a regulation, the limitations period begins to run when the agency publishes the regulation in the 
Federal Register.”).   
 108.  See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 666 F.2d 
595, 602-03 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“‘[T]hose who have had the opportunity to challenge general rules 
should not later be heard to complain of their invalidity on grounds fully known them at the time of 
their issuance.’” quoting Outward Cont’l N. Pac. Freight Conference v. Federal Martime Comm’n, 
385 F.2d 981, 982-83 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (emphasis added)); Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716 (“[A] 
substantive challenge to an agency decision alleging lack of agency authority may be brought within 
six years of the agency’s application of that decision to the specific challenger.” (emphasis added)). 
 109.  Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of 
Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1168 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).  The Maldonado 
court noted that several district courts have actually held that the statute of limitations cannot apply 
to First Amendment challenges, but no federal appellate court appears to have done so.  Maldonado 
and National Advertising both expressed “doubts” on the question but did not rule on the question. 
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cases.  This has led trial courts to sense the need for a saving rule, and 
they have seized on the preferred nature of expressive rights, concluding 
that facial First Amendment challenges are exempt from statutes of 
limitations when they are not. 
Perhaps the clearest example of this is Santa Fe Springs Realty 
Corp. v. City of Westminster,110 in which the owner of an adult cabaret 
challenged the facial validity of a zoning ordinance restricting adult 
businesses.  The district court rightly “refuse[d] to apply the rule 
applicable in takings cases” because the plaintiff was arguing that the 
ordinance resulted in “a continuing injury based upon [its] on-going 
effect on protected speech.”111  As in other “continuing injury” cases,112 
therefore, the lawsuit was timely because it was filed within the 
limitations period after the plaintiff’s rights were violated.  The district 
court went on to note that, given the desirability of facial challenges in 
many cases alleging First Amendment violations, it was doubtful 
whether a statute of limitations could apply at all to such laws.113   
Similarly, in 3570 East Foothill Blvd.,114 the plaintiff alleged the 
facial invalidity of zoning laws which placed certain limits on the live 
dancing that could be offered in clubs and restaurants.  The city argued 
that the facial challenge was time-barred because the one-year statute of 
limitations began to run when the restriction was passed.115  The district 
court was not convinced that the enactment of the law was the moment 
when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued: “In support of this 
argument, the City cites several takings cases, but no cases in the First 
Amendment context,” it noted.116  This was true, but the inapplicability 
of those cases did not turn on their First Amendment nature.  Rather, 
those cases did not apply because the ordinance “inflict[ed] a continuing 
harm” which “continues until the statute is either repealed or 
invalidated,”117 as opposed to inflicting a single harm through an 
immediate confiscation of property, which is the reason behind the facial 
 
 110.  906 F. Supp. 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 111.  Id. at 1364. 
 112.  The “continuing injury” doctrine holds that when a plaintiff is suffering not a discrete, 
particular injury, but an ongoing violation of rights, she may file suit at any time within the 
limitations period after the most recent incident.  See generally Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628 
(2007). 
 113.  Santa Fe Springs Realty, 906 F. Supp. at 1364-65 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59 (1988)). 
 114.  912 F. Supp. 1268 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 115.  Id. at 1278. 
 116.  Id. (citing Levald, 998 F.2d at 688). 
 117.  Id. See also Kannapolis, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38. 
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takings rule.  The court erred in concluding that facial challenges under 
the First Amendment are immune from statute-of-limitations questions.  
Instead, the case was a typical non-takings facial challenge to a law that 
inflicted a continuing injury; no new First Amendment rule was 
necessary. 
Santa Fe Springs Realty and 3570 East Foothill Blvd. involved the 
continuing injury exception to the statute-of-limitations bar, but the 
decisions do not represent any special statute-of-limitations rule for First 
Amendment cases.  On the contrary, the statute of limitations does apply 
to First Amendment cases,118 as is clear when a plaintiff alleges a 
discrete, rather than a continuing injury to First Amendment rights.  In 
Chardon v. Fernandez,119 for example, the plaintiffs alleged that they 
had been terminated from their teaching jobs for their political views, in 
violation of the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court found their cases 
barred by the statute of limitations.120  Likewise, in Hobson v. Wilson,121 
the Court of Appeals found that the statute of limitations applied to a 
lawsuit in which plaintiffs alleged that the FBI violated their First 
Amendment rights by conducting surveillance on them.  Thus, rather 
than establishing some special First Amendment immunity from the 
statute of limitations, cases like Santa Fe Springs Realty and 3570 East 
Foothill Blvd. are best seen as routine continuing-injury cases, applying 
the well-known rule that the statute of limitations will apply differently 
when the injury alleged is a “continuing” one.122 
While the Ninth Circuit was correct in observing that no circuit 
court has yet determined “whether a statute of limitations for § 1983 
actions can bar a facial challenge under the First Amendment to a state 
statute,”123 it would seem only to increase the doctrinal confusion to 
suggest that different kinds of constitutional arguments follow different 
accrual rules.  Future courts should rely instead on well-established 
standards: A party that brings a suit within the limitations period after 
 
 118.  See, e.g., Baranowski v. Waters, 2008 WL 728366 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008).  The 
statute-of-limitations period for civil rights violations has been found to be a procedural, rather than 
a jurisdictional, statute, and therefore it can be waived by a defendant, either consciously or through 
inaction.  Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 119.  454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam). 
 120.  Id. at 8.  See also Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz, 23 F.3d 607, 611 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 121.  737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 122.  Moreover, even in cases involving overbreadth challenges—which might be 
characterized as a species of continuing injury case—plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have 
been injured in fact.  Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988); Prime 
Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 485 F.3d 343, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 123.  Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955. 
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her injury has a timely case, and she may argue whatever theory is 
appropriate—that the law is unconstitutional as applied or 
unconstitutional on its face.  Of course, a plaintiff who alleges a 
continuing injury will be treated differently than a plaintiff who alleges a 
discrete injury, because each incident in a continuing injury resets the 
limitations period, and the plaintiff may bring a suit at any time within 
the limitations period after the last discrete act.124  But as far as the 
statute of limitations is concerned, no special rule distinguishes First 
Amendment cases from other theories of facial constitutional invalidity. 
B. Repose, Records, And Other Concerns 
One possible objection to the proposition that facial challenges do 
not automatically expire due to a law’s age is that the law favors a policy 
of repose to ensure that constitutional issues are settled and established.  
If a person can facially challenge the validity of a longstanding law, this 
might cause disruption and uncertainty.  There are two answers to this, 
one based in policy and the other on precedent.  First, there is no 
legitimate public interest in keeping facially unconstitutional laws on the 
books, no matter how old they might be.  As Frederick Douglass said, 
nothing is settled which is not right.125  While individuals might form 
certain expectations on the basis of facially unconstitutional laws, and 
while courts may take such expectations into account, this is relevant 
only to the remedy that the court will provide—not to the questions of 
the merits or timing of a facial challenge.  A court might decide that 
although a law is facially unconstitutional, declaring it invalid 
immediately will result in unfair surprise to innocent parties and might 
tailor its remedy accordingly.126  But it cannot declare that, because a 
facially unconstitutional law has been on the books for years, plaintiffs 
are barred from alleging that the law is, in fact, facially unconstitutional. 
Second, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on facial 
challenges indicate that rather than requiring facial challenges to be 
brought quickly, the Court actually prefers facial challenges to be 
brought after some time has passed, and after the law in question has 
been applied and has been subjected to legal analysis by lower courts.  In 
 
 124.  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002); Heard v. Sheahan, 253 
F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 125.  Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of the Fourth of July for The Negro (July 5, 1852) 
reprinted in P. FONER & Y. TAYLOR, EDS., FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND 
WRITINGS 192 (1999). 
 126.  Cf. In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 171 (Cal. 1858) (applying the decision only prospectively, to 
avoid surprise). 
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Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,127 the 
Court observed that the state had not had an “opportunity to implement” 
the challenged law, “and its courts have had no occasion to construe the 
law in the context of actual disputes” or to “accord the law a limiting 
construction to avoid constitutional questions.”128  The Justices were 
therefore reluctant to address its facial validity since “[c]laims of facial 
invalidity often rest on speculation” and risk a premature judgment about 
the law’s constitutional effect.129  The case does not represent an effort 
to grant facially unconstitutional laws any degree of repose, but rather a 
desire on the Justices’ part to minimize speculative, potentially advisory 
opinions, and thereby to reduce the Court’s interference in democratic 
processes.130  Whatever weight these concerns deserve, they do not 
suggest that a policy of repose justifies limiting facial challenges to any 
specific limitations period subsequent to the enactment of a challenged 
law. 
A similar concern appears in recent Supreme Court decisions that 
have narrowed the availability of facial challenges to statutes.  
Unfortunately, one of these decisions has fostered further confusion.  In 
Gonzales v. Carhart,131 the Court found it improper to entertain a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of the federal partial birth abortion ban, 
both because it was inappropriate “to resolve questions of 
constitutionality with respect to each potential situation that might 
develop,”132 and because the law was “open to a proper as-applied 
challenge in a discrete case.”133  This language indicates the Court’s 
reluctance to engage in roving constitutional analysis, and it is true that 
Article III principles bar the Court from resolving merely potential 
controversies or issuing other advisory opinions.134  Yet the Carhart 
Court’s reluctance to entertain a facial challenge is confusing, given the 
fact that the Court never explicitly questioned whether the parties had 
the standing, injury, and redressability required to invoke federal court 
jurisdiction.  So long as those factors are present, the Court has power to 
consider a law’s constitutionality, either facially or as applied.  The 
Court did have power to entertain the facial challenge in Carhart, and 
 
 127.  128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008). 
 128.  Id. at 1190. 
 129.  Id. at 1191. 
     130.     See Roger Pilon, Foreword: Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges: Does It Matter? 2008-
2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. vii, ix-xi. 
 131.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 132.  Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 700 (1997). 
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nearly all of the Court’s abortion cases have involved facial attacks on 
abortion restrictions.   
But while the dissenters observed that the majority’s rejection of 
the facial challenge was “perplexing,”135 even they failed to note that the 
majority opinion wrongly suggested that facial challenges and as-applied 
challenges are conceptually distinct categories of adjudication, subject to 
different jurisdictional prerequisites.  They are not; these terms are 
simply different ways of characterizing the nature of a law’s 
unconstitutionality.  If the Carhart Court simply believed it imprudent to 
address the question of facial constitutionality without a more fully 
established record, or doubted the plaintiffs’ standing, it ought to have 
been more explicit in so holding.136  As it stands, Carhart’s language 
suggests the wrong conclusion that facial challenges are a different 
category of adjudication from as-applied challenges.  If uncorrected, that 
misconception is bound to wreak havoc on well-established rules of civil 
procedure. 
Whatever else Carhart stands for, it does not hold that facial 
challenges are barred by the passage of time after a law’s enactment.  On 
the contrary, as in Washington State Grange, the Court simply indicated 
a need for more information before adjudicating the constitutionality 
arguments, information which would come through the law being 
applied in the particular circumstances of a case.137  Indeed, in Crawford 
v. Marion County Election Board,138 issued the same term as 
Washington State Grange, and only a year after Carhart, the Justices 
expressed reluctance to find a law facially invalid “on the basis of the 
record that has been made in this litigation”139 and concluded that “the 
evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the 
validity of the entire statute.”140  Thus, the Court did have authority to 
entertain the facial challenge but found that challenge unconvincing.  
Carhart’s confusion springs, no doubt, from the preemptive nature of 
 
 135.  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 136.  The Court was more explicit about the prudential basis of its reluctance to consider a 
facial challenge in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004): “Facial challenges of this sort are 
especially to be discouraged. Not only do they invite judgments on fact-poor records, but they entail 
a further departure from the norms of adjudication in federal courts: overbreadth challenges call for 
relaxing familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination that the law would be 
unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand.”  Id. 
at 609-10. 
 137.  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 168.   
 138.  128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 139.  Id. at 1623. 
 140.  Id. at 1615.   
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that particular lawsuit, and it indicates that, like all constitutional 
litigation, facial challenges are more likely to succeed with a robust 
evidentiary record and (as required by Article III standing principles) 
after a particular plaintiff has demonstrated a particular injury.  Facial 
challenges remain available in any case in which a plaintiff has been 
injured by the application of a law, even an antiquated law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A common misconception holds that a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a law must be brought within a certain period after 
the enactment of that law.  This is incorrect.  Any challenge to a law’s 
constitutionality must be brought within the limitations period after the 
plaintiff is injured by the law, whenever form that injury might take.  
Only very rarely will the injury occur through the mere enactment of the 
law.  Once injured, a plaintiff can challenge the law’s constitutionality 
either facially or as-applied.  Facial constitutional challenges should not 
be confused with facial takings claims; the latter do accrue upon 
enactment, because the enactment is deemed to have “taken” the 
property value.  But where a facial takings claim seeks compensation for 
an otherwise valid law that deprives the owner of property, a facial 
constitutional challenge asserts that the targeted law is never 
constitutional under any circumstances.  The facial/as-applied distinction 
therefore characterizes the nature of the arguments on the merits, and 
bears no relation to the jurisdictional questions of when a plaintiff has 
been injured by the challenged law or when her lawsuit is timely filed. 
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